http://www.fourmilab.ch/speakfree/

Pulver may be one of pioneers in VoIP as seen by *recent* standards, i.e. SIP.

But John Walker's SpeakFreely was already 12 years old at its end of life in 2004. It was true open source (long before the term "open source" was coined) VoIP (before the term "VoIP" existed) p2p (before... well, you get it) internet telephone application that also used PGP encryption to secure the channel.

Some things where invented much earlier than people think. Just well forgotten.

Eugene

Blades that have the all the same advantages over traditional 1U servers as this design did not replace 1U servers for one reason: customers are wary of vendor lock-in. It is impossible to replace some of your blades with hardware from a different vendor. This cookie sheet design has the same problem. It's just about taking the worst from both worlds...

Eugene

>> "ISPs routinely filter the source addresses of packets to stop

>> exactly this kind of shenanigans, and have done for years.."

> Your faith in ISPs is ... touching.

Source address filtering does not work against DNS poisoning attack, as the forged packets have the source address of the real DNS server.

On a related note, Polyakov's attack (practically) cannot be mounted against ISP servers, due to bandwidth constraints. But, it *can* be mounted against a corporate network by means of trojaned system(s) on the LAN. OTOH, in the latter case, the attack can be stopped by packet filtering.

Eugene

"Google icon with devil horns please."

Yes, pretty please! (maybe both: 'g' with a halo and with horns)

"Given the ultra-insular culture at Apple, it's hard to know why engineers chose to patch some Mac versions and not others. It's possible they reckoned clients handle so few DNS queries that it didn't make sense. Or they may have overlooked it."

When the nameserver runs in "forwarder" mode, i.e. it forwards all requests to a single "real" server, it is not vulnerable to the cache poisoning attack. Desktop systems are pretty much always set up this way, so they are not actually vulnerable => no need to hurry with the update.

The researcher either has overlooked that, or was misunderstood.

Eugene

What baffles me most, is that most SIP equipment and service providers publish their POTS numbers but *not* their SIP URLs. Why such negligence to the very technology that they are supposed to promote to the rest of the world?

In the old days of Soviet Union, there was a joke around there: a visitor from abroad falls into an open manhole in the street, and complains: "You should have marked it with warning flags, at least!", to which the locals respond: "When you landed in Sheremetevo, did you see the big red flag? It applies to the whole territory".

In these days when Microsoft is as almighty as the the Soviet Union used to [be perceived to] be, the joke would rather read: "Did you see the flying windows flag when it booted? Well that was the warning sign, it applies to everything you do on this computer".